It remains unknown to what extent the human visual system interprets information 13 about complex scenes without conscious analysis. Here we used visual masking 14 techniques to assess whether illusory contours (Kanizsa shapes) are perceived when 15 the inducing context creating this illusion does not reach awareness. In the first 16 experiment we tested perception directly by having participants discriminate the 17 orientation of an illusory contour. In the second experiment, we exploited the fact 18 that the presence of an illusory contour enhances performance on a spatial 19 localization task. Moreover, in the latter experiment we also used a different 20 masking method to rule out the effect of stimulus duration. Our results suggest that 21 participants do not perceive illusory contours when they are unaware of the 22 inducing context. This is consistent with theories of a multistage, recurrent process 23 of perceptual integration. Our findings thus challenge some reports, including those 24 from neurophysiological experiments in anaesthetized animals. Furthermore, we 25 discuss the importance to test the presence of the phenomenal percept directly with 26 appropriate methods. 27 28 Keywords 29 30
Introduction 34 35
What role does conscious processing of the environment fulfill and how much 36 processing occurs in the absence of awareness? It is self-evident that much of the 37 internal bodily functions and the learned motor behaviors, such as walking or 38 driving, operate mostly without awareness. But for processing through the classical 39 senses, like vision, there have been widely discrepant findings on how much stimulus 40 processing can occur and how it affects decision-making when the subject is 41 unaware of the stimulus. Moreover, the approach to be used when studying 42 unconscious stimulus processing has also been subject of controversy [1] . 43
44 Several experiments suggest that the effect of contextual stimuli within a target, 45 such as the percept of visual illusions or adaptation effects, persists even when 46 participants are unaware of the presented contextual information [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . The use of 47 continuous flash suppression (CFS), in which a dynamic, high-contrast stimulus is 48 presented to one eye to suppress the stimulus in the other eye from awareness, has 49 become a popular way to probe unconscious stimulus processing [7] . Using this 50 procedure it has been claimed that the perception of physical facial attributes [8] , 51 the complex analysis of naturalistic scenes [9] , and even linguistic processing and 52 arithmetic can be performed without awareness [10] . However, several of these 53 findings have recently failed to be replicated and were challenged on theoretical 54 grounds [11] [12] [13] . 55
56
Neuroimaging experiments showed that while both simple and more complex 57 stimuli have a neural signature in the visual cortex under masking conditions [14-58 16], the encoding of unconscious stimuli appears to be qualitatively different. Not 59 only is the overall response to unconscious visual stimuli weaker [15] but coupling 60 between different stages in the visual processing hierarchy is also reduced [17] and 61 the information content differs [16, 18, 19] . In particular, the response to these 62 stimuli is more variable [20] , and also localized in more posterior regions than to 63 conscious stimuli [18] . . One reason for this variability could be that only simple 64 128
In the present paper, we carried out two experiments to address these confounds 129
and answer the question of whether Kanizsa contours are formed when inducers are 130 not consciously perceived. In experiment 1, we used a similar design as in our 131 previous study [22] . Here, participants were asked to discriminate the orientation of 132 a Kanizsa triangle. However, instead of CFS we employed a temporal masking 133 method to render the inducers invisible. Moreover, we included a control condition 134 in which a real, luminance-defined contour was present. Because this masking 135 method relies on very brief stimulus durations, in experiment 2 we presented long 136 (500ms) stimuli rendered invisible by means of fast counter-phase flicker [3, 21] . This 137 is critical because the formation of illusory contours arise comparably slowly [36-38] 138 and thus may be disrupted by a fast temporal masking technique.. In addition to this, 139 previous research demonstrated that the presence of illusory contours boosts 140 participants' ability to discriminate the position of a tiny target [23, 39] , providing a 141 specific test of whether the participant in fact perceives an illusory contour or not. 142
We therefore measured the ability of a group of participants, who were well trained 143 at psychophysical tasks, to discriminate the position of a dot target for Kanizsa and 144 control stimuli presented with or without masking. Participants in experiments 1 were recruited among the UCL student population. In 154 experiment 2 we recruited participants who were familiar with psychophysical tasks. 155
All Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. 156 chin rest located at a fixed distance of 48cm from the stimulus presentation screen 160 where stimuli were presented to them binocularly. 161 162 Stimuli were generated by a computer and presented on a 22-inch Samsung 163 SM2233RZ LCD monitor at a resolution of 1680 x 1050 pixels. Screen refresh rate in 164 experiment 1 was set to 60Hz. In experiment 2 it was set to 120Hz. The experiment 165 was controlled and behavioral responses were recorded using MATLAB (The 166
Mathworks, Inc.) and Psychtoolbox 3 [40] using a standard keyboard. The experiment comprised two tasks: the first, henceforth called 'Kanizsa' task, 171 investigated whether participants can perceive illusory contours without awareness 172 of their inducers. The second task, the 'Visibility' task, assessed the effectiveness of 173 the masking technique directly. 174
175

Study design 176 177
Like our earlier experiment using continuous flash suppression, this experiment 178 aimed to measure the perception of illusory contours in a direct manner. We 179 implemented a 2x3 design with visibility (invisible, visible) and type of stimulus (real, 180 illusory, control) as within subject factors. 181 182 Every participant completed two different tasks. Each task comprised 25 blocks of 183 trials, where one block consisted of 24 trials in the Kanizsa task and 8 trials in the 184 visibility task. Across one task, each condition appeared 100 times. The visibility task 185 only comprised the visible and invisible control conditions. Kanizsa task: At first, participants were instructed that they would see a triangle 258 appear on the screen. They were asked to judge whether its hypotenuse was tilted 259 clockwise or counter-clockwise from vertical by pressing the corresponding response 260 key. We explained this task to them as a decision whether the right angle of the 261 triangle was pointing to the left or to the right but they were told explicitly to judge 262 the contours of the triangle, in particular the long hypotenuse extending through the 263 center of the stimulus display. Because we wished to keep the contrast between real 264 triangle and the background as low as possible, we trained participants on the visible 265 and invisible real triangle condition until they were able to detect them correctly. 266
267
Participants were instructed to fixate a small black dot (0.2° wide) that was present 268 in the center of the screen throughout the experiment. On each trial, the fixation dot 269 was displayed alone for 500ms. This was followed by a sequence of three frames 270 that defined whether the condition was a visible or an invisible one. In the invisible 271 condition a 300ms mask followed the fixation period. Subsequently, the stimulus 272 appeared on the screen for one frame of approx. 16.7 milliseconds (ms), 273 immediately followed by a blank screen that was shown for one frame as well. This 274 mask-stimulus-blank sequence was repeated three times before a second and final 275 post-stimulus blank screen was presented until participants gave their response. 276 Figure 2A shows the general paradigm for the experimental procedure. 277
278
Visibility task: We further tested whether participants indeed did not consciously 279 perceive any contextual information of the stimuli in the invisible condition. For this 280 purpose, the visibility task assessed the effectiveness of the masking technique by 281 measuring whether participants could consciously discriminate the inducer 282 elements. Participants were asked to judge whether a right angle was presented in 283 the left or right bottom inducer. The timing of the trial sequence in this task was 284 identical to the Kanizsa task, with one exception: only control stimuli were used 285 ( Figure 2B responses in each condition. Initially, we conducted binomial tests at the individual 303 level to quantify how many participants performed significantly above chance. A 304 condition for any participant's data to be considered in the group analysis of this 305 experiment was that their performance to the invisible real stimulus condition was 306 significantly above chance (0.5). This is because the features necessary to distinguish 307 the contours of the real triangle were not masked and if a participant could not 308 perform the task for this particular stimulus, any test of the perception of illusory 309 contours would be redundant. 310
311
One-sample t-tests were carried out at the group level for each condition individually 312 to assess whether the participants' level of performance was significantly above 313 chance (>0.5). In addition to traditional frequentist statistical tests, we also 314 quantified the evidence for or against the hypothesis that participants could 315 discriminate the stimuli by calculating a Bayes Factor using a default Cauchy prior 316 with scaling factor 0.707 for the alternative hypothesis [44] . For conditions with 317 performance near chance levels, this enabled us to also quantify how strongly the 318 evidence supported the null hypothesis that participants were actually guessing. 319 320 321
Experiment 2 322 323
This experiment only comprised one task that tested the percept of illusory contours 324 by measuring participants' threshold on a spatial localization task. Such a 325 manipulation has been used successfully in previous experiments [23, 39] . While it is 326 an indirect test, the contour aids performance on the spatial localization task. This 327 provides independent evidence about whether participants perceived any illusory 328 contours and therefore helps to address confounds with measuring the percept 329 directly as we did in experiment 1. Pilot experiments using a task in which we 330 directly measured the illusory percept (the same task as experiment 1 but with the 331 long-lasting masking technique employed in experiment 2) could encourage 332 participants to pay close attention to the masked context and thus reduce the 333 effectiveness of the masking procedure. This would mean that participants use 334 residual awareness of the inducers to perform the task instead of actually making a 335 perceptual judgment of the illusory contour. 336 337 Moreover, because the masking procedure in experiment 1 used very brief 338 presentations of the invisible Kanizsa stimuli (16.7ms) while these were much longer 339 (300ms) for the visible ones, in experiment 2 we used a different masking procedure: 340 stimuli were defined by sinusoidal gratings which reversed contrast polarity at 341 120Hz. This method can effectively render stimuli invisible for prolonged periods so 342 that participants only perceive a grey screen. Previous research suggests that stimuli 343 masked in this way are processed in early visual cortex [3] . Moreover, we showed 344 that stimuli rendered invisible by this method could induce local priming effects on a 345 shape discrimination task [21] . We generated a Kanizsa shape by presenting four Gabor patches (sinusoidal gratings 363 with wavelength 0.33° visual angle convolved with a Gaussian with standard 364 deviation 0.8° at 30% contrast) in the locations of the four corners of a square with a 365 side-length of 8.2°. We turned these patches into Pacmen by setting a right-angled 366 region of each patch to zero contrast (uniform background grey). This stimulus thus 367 described an illusory square ( Figure 3A ). In the control conditions, the Pacmen were 368 rotated by 180° so that the corners faced outward breaking the illusory percept 369 ( Figure 3B ). In the real luminance control, we did not present any Gabor patches but 370 instead a square region with a subtle luminance contrast (54 cd/m 2 ) relative to the 371 background ( Figure 3C ). The orientation and phase of each Gabor patch was 372 randomized in each trial. Finally, we created a mask stimulus by overlaying 24 Gabor 373 patches in the four locations. These patches were presented at 5% contrast and 374 covered the full range of orientations in equal steps of 15° but their phases were 375 randomized. This resulted in a patchy pattern without any obvious orientation cue 376 ( Figure 3D ). The mask pattern was also generated anew in every trial. started with 500ms of a blank grey screen that only contained a black fixation dot 407 (diameter 0.26°). This was followed by a 100ms presentation of the mask and then 408 500ms of the stimulus, after which another 100ms mask interval was presented. 409
Then the screen turned grey and the fixation dot was removed, indicating that 410 participants could give their behavioral response. 411
412
During the stimulus interval the fixation dot was blue instead of black to denote that 413 this was the task-relevant interval. As described above, the stimuli in this interval 414 either reversed in contrast polarity at 120Hz (invisible Kanizsa and control 415 conditions) or the frames were interleaved with blank frames (visible Kanizsa, real 416 luminance stimuli and control). During the stimulus presentation the small dark 417 target dot also appeared at some location along the horizontal meridian. Its position 418 was randomized to be either near the left or the right vertical boundary of the 419 square region. The dot could either appear inside or outside the square region. 420
421
The dependent variable in this experiment was the distance between the target dot 422 and the boundary of the square region and it was controlled by a 2-down, 1-up 423 staircase procedure that converged on the threshold distance in each of the five 424 experimental conditions at which performance was approximately 70.7% correct. 425
That is, after every consecutive two correct trials the distance would decrease by 426 one pixel (~0.03°) while after every incorrect trial it increased by one pixel. All five 427 staircases started at a distance of 15 pixels (0.49°). The minimum and maximum that 428 they could reach were one pixel and 25 pixels (0.82°), respectively. showing them still images of the stimuli, we specifically explained to them that this 434 boundary was defined by the exact center of the Gabor patches (i.e. the corner of 435 the Pacman's mouth) and that this was identical in both the Kanizsa and the control 436 conditions. We further informed them that there would be a third condition in which 437 they should only see a subtly lighter grey square against the background but no 438
Gabor patches. In order to become acquainted with the task, they then performed 1-439 2 blocks of the experiment with only the visible Kanizsa, the control and the real 440 luminance condition. Finally, the actual experiment would commence. Participants 441 were informed that the task was largely always the same as the familiarization run, 442 although during this experiment there would be many more trials in which they 443 either only see a light grey square but no Gabor patches or that they might even only 444 see a grey blank screen. Except for the author, all participants were unaware of the 445 experimental hypothesis. In debriefing none of the participants reported seeing any 446
Gabor patches during the invisible condition. Accuracy across participants for discriminating the orientation of the triangle for the 479 six conditions is displayed in Figure 4 . We tested whether discrimination 480 performance in each condition was above chance at the group level. 481
482
In the visible condition, the mean proportion of correct responses for the group was 483 close to ceiling and clearly better than chance both for the real (M=0.97, t(16)=83.5, 484 p< 0.001, BF 10 >9.8*10 18 ) and the illusory condition (M=0.99, t(16)=120.8, p<0.0001, 485 BF 10 >2.4*10 21 ). In the control condition, however, the group performed significantly 486 below chance level (M=0.30, t(16)=-3.87, p=0.001, BF 10 =29.3). There was 487 considerable variability in performance for this condition ranging from 0 to 0.74. 488
489
In the invisible condition, only performance on the real triangle condition was 490 significantly above chance level (M=0.71, t(16)=6.4, p<0.001, BF 10 =2608.7). 491
Performance on both the illusory triangle condition (M=0.51, t(16)=1, p=0.332, 492 BF 10 =0.385) and the control condition (M=0.50, t(16)=0.2, p=0.859, BF 10 =0.253) were 493 at chance level. Importantly, performance on the real triangle condition was also 494 significantly greater than for either the illusory contour (t(16)=6.1, p<0.0001, 495 BF 10 =1475.4) or the control condition (t(16)=5.6, p<0.0001, BF 10 =688). In contrast, 496 performance for the illusory contour did not differ from the control condition 497 masking conditions. In the visible condition, the mean proportion of correct 505 responses across participants was again close to ceiling and far above chance level 506 (M=0.96, t(16)=22.2, p<0.001, BF 10 >2.9*10 10 ). In contrast, participants' mean 507 performance in the invisible condition did not significantly differ from chance level 508 (M=0.48, t(16)=-1.3, p=0.227, BF 10 =0.489), suggesting that participants could 509 generally not perceive the inducers under masking conditions. Note, however, that 510 there was only anecdotal support for the null hypothesis (BF 10 >1/3). 511
512
The first experiment thus suggested that if participants were unaware of the 513 inducers because they had been masked, they were unable to judge the orientation 514 of the Kanizsa triangle. This supports the interpretation that illusory contours are not 515 formed under these conditions. 516 517 518 In experiment 2 we changed the approach in a number of ways. First, instead of the 527 brief stimulus presentations used in the first experiment we used counter-phase 528 flicker to render stimuli invisible for prolonged periods. Moreover, we used an 529 indirect measure of illusory contour processing: we took advantage of previous 530 reports that the presence of an illusory contour stimulus enhanced participants' 531 thresholds at discriminating the position of a small dot [23,39]. Here we tested 532 whether this also occurred when the inducers generating the illusory contour were 533 invisible. Because this task was more challenging than those in previous 534 experiments, and to rule out that our previous results might have been due to 535 insufficient practice or familiarity with psychophysical experiments, in this 536 experiment we only tested a small group of well-trained psychophysics participants. Kanizsa stimulus was presented were significantly lower than those measured for 541 control stimuli (F(1,4)=34.6, p=0.004). There was also a non-significant trend of 542 lower thresholds during visible than invisible trials (F(1,4)=7.5, p=0.052). Importantly, 543
there was a significant interaction between visibility and stimulus type (F(1,4)=15.9, 544 p=0.016). In the visible condition thresholds measured while an illusory Kanizsa 545 contour was present were significantly lower (M=0.08°, t(4)=-5.27, p=0.006, 546 BF 10 =9.95) compared to the control condition without a contour (M=0.21°). In 547 contrast, in the invisible condition the difference in thresholds for illusory contours 548 (M=0.20°) was not significantly different from that for the control stimulus (M=0.21°, 549 t(4)=-0.16, p=0.882, BF 10 = 0.4). 550
551
Thresholds measured for the real luminance contour were of a similar magnitude as 552 those measured for the visible illusory contour (M=0.10°, t(4)=-0.92, p=0.409, 553 BF 10 =0.55). In contrast, thresholds for the real luminance contour were significantly 554 lower than for invisible Kanizsa stimuli (t(4)=3.84, p=0.019, BF 10 =4.53). Thresholds 555 for the real luminance contour were also significantly lower than for either control 556 stimulus (visible: t(4)=4.4, p=0.012, BF 10 =6.19; invisible: t(4)=5.3, p=0.006, BF 10 =9.9). In our first experiment, we directly measured illusory contour perception by asking 575 participants to discriminate the orientation of a Kanizsa triangle. This procedure was 576 akin to our earlier experiments [22] that showed no evidence either that illusory 577 contours are formed when inducers are suppressed from awareness. In those 578 experiments we employed CFS in which a dynamic, high-contrast mask presented to 579 one eye suppresses awareness of a stimulus viewed by the fellow eye. Similarly, 580 previous studies showed that illusory contours are not formed when the inducers 581 are suppressed from awareness during binocular rivalry [23]. However, because 582 previous reports indicate that illusory contours are processed by binocular neurons 583
[30-33] the use of dichoptic stimuli may simply disrupt their processing. 584 585 Therefore here we used normal binocular viewing conditions and a different method 586 to render the inducers invisible. In addition, we included a real luminance contour 587 condition as a baseline check. This helped to rule out another trivial explanation for 588 our earlier findings: The presence of the bright masks could possibly have obscured 589 the detection of the subtle illusory boundary. Our real luminance contour was never 590 masked because the masks only overlapped with the corners of the triangle; 591 therefore, if participants were able to discriminate the subtle real luminance contour 592 they should also be able to do so if an illusory contour were indeed formed. We only 593 included participants for whom discrimination of this real luminance contour was 594 significantly above chance levels. Nonetheless, participants were unable to 595 discriminate the orientation of the illusory contour when inducers were masked. The 596 phenomenological experience of the real luminance and the illusory contour is not 597 perfectly identical (and it obviously is not for the visible conditions). However, the 598 real luminance conditions were very faint while illusory contours tend to be 599 subjectively quite salient. Thus it seems unlikely that participants should be able to 600 detect only the real luminance contour but not the illusory contour. 601 602 Experiment 1 also contained control conditions in which the individual inducers had 603 been rotated by 180° and thus no illusory triangle should be formed. These were 604 essentially catch trials because participants should have been guessing, as there was 605 no actual triangle to discriminate. This was clearly the case for control stimuli when 606 inducers were invisible. However, for visible control stimuli discrimination 607 performance varied widely from 0-0.74 proportion correct responses and was even 608 significantly below chance level. The "correct" responses in this condition were 609 dummy coded so that the stimulus-response mapping matched that for the 610 equivalent illusory triangle stimuli before rotating the inducers. Therefore one 611 inducer in the top row had a right-angled cutout that pointed inwards (Figure 1 ) and 612 this would be consistent with the presence of a triangle oriented in the opposite 613 direction (even though no actual triangle should be perceived). Some participants 614 may have adopted this stimulus response mapping while others did not. It would 615 therefore have been better to have all inducers point outwards in this control and 616 randomize their locations. However, our actual results serendipitously support the 617 fact that masking was effective in this experiment: The fact that participants 618 performed at chance level when the control stimuli were masked rules out that they 619 had any residual awareness of the inducers. The results of our explicit Visibility task 620 after the main experiment also corroborated this conclusion. 621
622
The results of experiment 1 contradict previous claims that a "ghostly triangle" could 623 be perceived when the inducers of a Kanizsa triangle were masked [24] . However, 624
follow-up experiments failed to replicate these experiments but instead suggested 625 that conscious processing of the inducers precedes awareness of the illusory 626 contours and that these earlier results were in fact due to residual awareness of the 627 inducers [45] . Another critical issue with these experiments is that the perception of 628 illusory contours is based on a Yes or No judgment of whether a triangle shape was 629 present. Such a task could theoretically be performed based on any residual 630 awareness of the corners in the inducers. Our task required an explicit orientation 631 discrimination of the illusory contour. If participants had been able to perform this 632 task in spite of being unable to perceive the inducers, this would have been more 633 conclusive evidence that illusory contours are indeed formed when inducers are 634 masked. 635 636 Naturally, our design that split the main task from a test of awareness did not allow 637 us to measure the awareness on each actual trial of the main experiment -only a 638 dual-task design in which visibility is probed directly in the main experiment would 639 permit this. However, a dual-task design cannot classify the awareness of individual 640 trials perfectly as the participant's judgment of their own awareness is subject to 641 variability. Dual-tasks also entail a division of attentional resources across the 642 different task components. It could be argued that the Visibility task was more 643 difficult than the Kanizsa task because the former required the judgment of one a 644 small, peripheral feature of the stimulus. This may complicate the interpretation of 645 chance performance on this task. 646 647 Experiment 1 also used very brief stimulus presentations and powerful, high-contrast 648 masks to render stimuli invisible. Rather than the absence of awareness, the reason 649 why invisible contours were not formed could be the brevity of the stimuli or 650 because the mask fundamentally disrupted stimulus processing. This is certainly a 651 possibility because previous research indicated that the processing of illusory 652 contours occurs relatively slowly [36] [37] [38] . Therefore, in our second experiment, we 653 used counter-phase flicker to mask the inducers instead of the masking methods 654 employed in the earlier experiments. This allowed us to present stimuli for 655 prolonged periods. While this is also a temporal masking procedure, the stimulus 656 energy is constant during the entire presentation because only the polarity changes 657 between frames. Furthermore, we exploited the fact that the presence of an illusory 658 contour enhances performance on a dot localization task because it provides a visual 659 aid for determining its spatial location [23, 39] . We confirmed this advantage when 660 inducers were not masked and performance was comparable to when we presented 661 real luminance contours only. However, when inducers were rendered invisible this 662 advantage for illusory contours disappeared. This task may actually be an even more 663 appropriate test of the induction of illusory contours than testing discrimination of 664 the contour itself as in experiment 1. For that experiment, the interpretation is 665 unproblematic because we found no evidence of discrimination when inducers were 666 masked. However, if we had found above chance performance for masked stimuli, it 667 would have been impossible to conclude that this was not due to discrimination of 668 the inducers. Pilot experiments for experiment 2 suggested that with the long-lasting 669 counter-phase flicker masking, participants might in occasional trials have had some 670 residual awareness of the corners in the inducers. Thus they might still have 671 performed above chance at a shape/orientation discrimination on the purported 672 illusory contour even though they did not in fact perceive any illusory contour. This 673 problem also plagues many previous experiments that directly tested the presence 674 of an illusory shape [36, 37] . Therefore, only a task that exploits the presence of the 675 illusory contour to modulate performance on an orthogonal task, like the dot 676 localization task we used, can provide conclusive evidence that an illusory contour 677 was in fact perceived. An alternative possibility could be a task that relies on a fine 678 discrimination of a feature of the illusory contour such as its curvature [38] but even 679 such discriminations may be confounded (with?) discrimination of the inducers 680 [46, 47] . 681
682
In all tests of performance against chance levels we used Bayesian hypothesis tests 683 that can quantify the strength of evidence for the null hypothesis indicating that 684 participants were guessing [44] . None of these tests revealed strong evidence for the 685 null hypothesis as typical Bayes Factors fell between 0.3-0.5. To establish more 686 compelling support for the null hypothesis in those cases much larger samples would 687 be required. Crucially, the Bayes Factor indicates by how much the observed 688 evidence should update one's prior belief in the null or alternative hypothesis. Even 689 if the evidence is relatively weak, any Bayes Factor below 1 is evidence in favor of 690 the null and not for the alternative hypothesis. Unless one starts with a prior belief 691 that people are clearly able to discriminate masked stimuli, even these modest Bayes 692
Factors suggest that participants were probably guessing. 693
694
Several previous studies used stimulus manipulations that seek to disentangle the 695 factors associated with Kanizsa-type illusory contours [39, 48, 49] . Rounding the 696 corners of the Pacman inducers results in a notable reduction in the illusory contour 697 percept and abolishes the concordant improvement on a spatial localization task. 698
However, stimuli like this nonetheless activated higher extrastriate cortex to a 699 similar degree as Kanizsa stimuli [39] . This is consistent with the theory that later 700 stages of visual processing, presumably mediated by higher visual areas, segment 701 surfaces and assign boundaries to objects. These segmentations are then fed back to 702 early visual cortex to generate signals that are interpreted as illusory contours [48] . 703
Practical support for this idea comes from transcranial magnetic stimulation 704 experiments that disrupted neural processing either in object-sensitive lateral 705 occipital (LO) cortex or in early visual areas V1 and V2 [50] . Critically, the disruption 706 of LO cortex only abolished the illusory contour percept early after stimulus onset 707 while disruption of early visual areas only did so at a later stage -presumably 708 affecting feed-back signals rather than the early feed-forward response. 709
710
Additional stimulus processing that is unrelated to the actual formation of illusory 711 contours could also explain previous reports that Kanizsa stimuli are faster to break 712 through CFS masking than control stimuli [35] . The collinearity of edges and the 713 thereby inferred surface may be processed even while the stimulus is suppressed 714 from awareness -this may in turn produce an attentional signal that causes the 715 stimulus to break suppression. Recent experiments that tested a range of visual 716 control stimuli under CFS suggest that low-level properties of the stimulus determine 717 the time it takes to break suppression [51] . Such stimulus-dependent effects are also 718 plausible because attentional processing can occur without awareness of the 719 stimulus [52] [53] [54] . However, this does not prove that any percept of an illusory 720 contour was actually formed. This process may also explain why crowding interferes 721 with discrimination of the inducer orientation but not with illusory contour 722 formation [55] . 723 724 While we did not manipulate the presence of illusory contours in this way in our 725 experiments, we nonetheless controlled this factor by including real luminance 726 contour conditions. In experiment 2 the presence of a contour should afford an 727 improvement on an orthogonal spatial localization task. Such an improvement in 728 localization thresholds only occurred for the real luminance contour or when Kanizsa 729 inducers were visible. Improvements like this are not observed for stimuli that match 730 the global characteristics but which do not produce illusory contours [39] . Therefore 731 our results from this experiment strongly support the conclusion that illusory 732 contours were simply not formed when inducers were masked. 733
734
Our results also agree with previous findings that only local processing occurs in the 735 absence of awareness but that more complex analysis of scene geometry requires 736 conscious processing [21] . This would also explain why the nature of stimulus 737 representations in higher visual areas differs depending on awareness. 738 However, our findings do not accord with a number of other studies that suggest 740 that illusory contours are processed unconsciously. Experiments on a patient with 741 extinction due to a parietal lesion suggest that perception of a Kanizsa shape occurs 742 even when some inducers are placed into parts of the visual field where the patient's 743 conscious perception is impaired [26] [27] [28] [29] . These findings indicate that visual 744 processing operates at the surface-or object-based level. Segmenting and grouping 745 the local features of an image into a coherent, global shape may only require 746 awareness of some component features but it then spreads to the whole object. 747
However, this is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that these processes would 748 occur when the participant is unaware of all components. More importantly, it also 749 does not demonstrate that the percept of illusory contours was actually formed 750 under these conditions but only that some processing of the features producing 751 illusory contours under normal viewing conditions still occurred. 752
753
Another study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and an 754 inattentional blindness paradigm to study illusory contours processing [49] . 755
Participants were presented with a sequence of images, some of which contained 756
Kanizsa shapes whilst others were various types of control stimuli. Simultaneously, 757 participants were engaged in a demanding attentional task at fixation. A sub-group 758 of participants subsequently reported not to have seen any Kanizsa stimuli. These 759 participants nonetheless showed stronger fMRI responses to Kanizsa than control 760 stimuli. Multivariate classification methods further demonstrated that the activation 761 patterns produced by unseen Kanizsa stimuli were more reliable than those 762 produced by control stimuli. The authors suggested that the neural signature of 763 illusory contours differs from that of other, carefully matched stimuli and thus 764 argued that illusory contours are processed even without awareness of the stimuli. consciousness. However, this also makes it difficult to interpret these results. First, it 770 is unclear whether participants apparently oblivious to the presence of the stimuli 771 really did not perceive any illusory shapes. Due to the design of the experiment, 772 awareness could only be assessed after the main fMRI experiment rather than on a 773 trial-by-trial basis (but see above our discussion why such trial-by-trial judgments of 774 awareness are complicated). Only participants who reported having seen the actual 775
Kanizsa stimulus during the experiment were classified as having had awareness of 776 the stimuli. However, many of the candidate stimuli were similar Kanizsa shapes. 777
Therefore it is possible that participants had some awareness of the stimuli, even if 778 an imprecise one. 779 780 Second, while the control stimuli in the main fMRI experiment were very carefully 781 matched to rule out the influence of global characteristics this can by definition only 782 be an approximation: if conditions were perfectly matched, the stimulus would be 783 identical and thus an illusory contour would be perceived. It is possible that the 784 conditions resulting in an illusory contour percept are also particularly effective in 785 producing discriminable activation patterns in visual cortex. For instance, the 786 contrast energy along the mouths of the Pacmen inducers differed considerably 787 between the Kanizsa and the global control stimuli. Thus, surface segmentation or 788 collinear interactions may have also differed between these conditions. 789 790 All these issues again highlight an important point: The only way one can truly infer 791 that illusory contours are formed is by using a measure that is specific to the 792 presence of an illusory contour. This is indeed what we did in our previous CFS 793 experiment [22] , our present experiment 1, or what was done in several other 794 previous experiments [23,34,50,55], by asking participants to directly report a 795 feature of the contour. Another useful manipulation is the spatial localization task 796 used by other studies [23,39] as well as our experiment 2. This is because the 797 performance enhancement only occurs in the presence of an actual contour helping 798 the participant to localize the target. Many previous studies suggesting that illusory 799 contours are processed without awareness of the inducers are confronted with this 800 problem. In the appendix we included another experiment in which we tested 801 whether Kanizsa shapes masked from awareness could nevertheless provide an 802 attentional cue for a subsequent visual search task. Even if a robust priming effect 803
were found in such an experiment, this design simply cannot rule out alternative 804 explanations. It only tests the consequences of the stimuli that may in fact not be 805 specific to illusory contours. 806
807
In the same vein, neurophysiological and neuroimaging experiments have shown 808 that illusory contours are encoded by neurons even in the early visual cortex 809
[25,33,56-67]. The overwhelming majority of these experiments were conducted on 810 awake participants. However, some neurophysiological studies reported neuronal 811 tuning to illusory contours even in anesthetized animals [25, 58, 67] . Such findings 812 seem to superficially contradict our conclusion that awareness of the inducing 813 stimuli is necessary for the formation of illusory contours. However, these 814 experiments are in fact a perfect illustration of the importance to distinguish 815 between perceptual experience and correlated processing. Because animals are 816 anesthetized in these experiments and thus by definition unaware of the stimuli, it is 817 impossible to determine whether illusory contours were formed. The neural 818 correlates of these stimuli could be related to the contextual processing of the 819 inducing stimuli, such as the discontinuities detected by "end-stopped cells" or the 820 detection of collinearity in the image. Such processing may indeed occur in the 821 absence of awareness as is supported by our finding of collinear priming [21] and the 822 induction of contextual visual illusions under masking conditions [2,3] or inattention 823
[6]. Furthermore, it is quite likely that such stimulus processing is a necessary 824 prerequisite for the formation of illusory contours. However, they do not 825 conclusively prove that illusory contours are formed under anesthesia. 826
827
A related issue is that all of these studies use illusory contours induced by abutting 828 lines (offset gratings) rather than Kanizsa shapes. While the two share a similar 829 phenomenology, contours induced by abutting lines are arguably simpler and may 830 be based mostly on local processing while Kanizsa shapes are likely to involve more 831 complex inferences of surface depth and boundary ownership. Our experiments did 832 not explicitly test illusory contours generated with abutting lines and therefore do 833 not speak to the question whether such simpler illusory contours are in fact 834 perceived when the inducers are masked. 835
836
We conclude that there is little evidence that Kanizsa-type illusory contours are 837 processed when participants are not aware of the inducing context. This appears to 838 be the case for a range of different methods to render the inducers invisible. 839
However, all of these experiments employed physical stimulus manipulations, while 840 it is likely that an experimental design that allows the use of the participant's own 841 report to determine awareness on a trial-by-trial basis whilst also testing directly 842 whether an illusory contour was in fact formed can answer this question 843 conclusively. 
